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Syria will test the durability of Obama’s grand strategy of
foreign policy restraint
Only a few weeks ago, commentators expected a showdown between President Obama and
Congress over military intervention in Syria. Now, after a chance proposal to disarm the regime
of its chemical weapons, Obama faces accusations of incoherence over foreign policy.
Michael Lumbers reviews Obama’s handling of the Syrian conflict, arguing that his foreign
policy agenda is a subtle but unmistakable move away from America’s post-war interventionist
role. In this light, the agreement on Syria is the best possible outcome for Obama. However,
given the current instability of the Middle East, it remains to be seen if this strategy is
sustainable. 
The last month will likely not be remembered as Barack Obama’s shining hour. The almost surreal spectacle
of  an American president, in two closely t imed nationally televised addresses, ef f ectively balking at
punishing Bashar al-Assad f or gassing his own cit izens, action that he had repeatedly insisted was needed
f or enf orcing international norms prohibit ing the use of  weapons of  mass destruction, was without parallel.
Obama’s decidedly uneven perf ormance, predictably, has provoked charges of  a rudderless administration,
one either unwilling or unable to f ormulate a coherent strategy f or Syria’s spiraling civil war and execute it.
This impression was cemented when Obama, looking f or a way out of  the corner into which he had painted
himself , was seemingly outf oxed by his sparring partner, Russian President Vladimir Putin, into embracing a
hole-ridden proposal f or disarming Syria of  its chemical weapons that of f ers Assad plenty of  scope f or
obf uscation and delay.
Yet while there is margin f or
censuring Obama’s handling of
the Syrian conf lict, his crit ics
have it wrong when they f ault
him f or lack of  consistency or
of  a distinct worldview.
Aversion to f oreign
entanglements, particularly in
the Middle East af ter an
exhausting decade of  f ruit less
war, has been a hallmark of
this administration’s strategic
thinking. The two obvious
outliers to this prevailing
orthodoxy, Af ghanistan and
Libya, were both undertaken
with considerable ambivalence.
Having ordered a surge of  U.S.
f orces in Af ghanistan in the f all
of  2009 af ter agonizing
deliberation, Obama soon developed buyer ’s remorse and ordered a drawdown of  troops at a rate f aster
than many of  his military advisers thought prudent; he is now f lirt ing with the option of  withdrawing all of
them af ter 2014. As f or the 2011 intervention in Libya, Obama only acted when he was convinced U.S.
objectives could be met at an acceptable cost: no boots on the ground, air strikes at the f ront end of  the
operation f ollowed promptly by a transf er of  responsibility to allies.
His meteoric polit ical rise f ueled by war-weary popular sentiment, Obama’s priorit ies as he entered the
White House were largely determined by the f inancial crisis and strategic overstretch he inherited. His
primary f oreign policy task, as he sees it, is bringing America’s commitments abroad into closer alignment
with its f inite resources. That means more self - restraint, less vigorous promotion of  democracy and regime
change, investing in renewal and ref orm at home, avoiding involvement in conf licts of  dubious strategic
value, encouraging other powers to play a more substantive role in managing global order and judiciously
applying more attention towards the dynamic Asia-Pacif ic. Taken together, this agenda amounts to a subtle,
yet unmistakable, renunciation of  the expansive conception of  American power harbored by all of  Obama’s
post-war predecessors and of  the received wisdom that U.S. security is inextricably linked to every corner
of  the globe. Embroilment in Syria represents the greatest threat to his strategic vision.
Small wonder, then, that Obama grasped Putin’s lif eline as an alternative to a military strike that had always
been more about upholding the credibility of  an of f handedly declared red line than ef f ecting change on the
ground in Syria. Making a dif f erence in a conf lict as complex as Syria’s, where it ’s dif f icult to distinguish
f riend f rom f oe among opposition f orces and Assad’s regime has demonstrated a resiliency f ew observers
init ially thought possible, would require action f ar more robust than the president has been willing to
contemplate.
Seen in this light, the recent announcement of  a f ramework agreement to remove chemical weapons f rom
Syria constituted the best possible outcome f or Obama. Had he instead pressed f or a military response, he
likely would have f ailed to secure Congressional authorization, then leaving him in the unenviable posit ion
of  either meekly acceding to the whims of  Capitol Hill or def ying the expressed will of  Congress and the
anti- interventionist sentiment of  voters. Moreover, Assad could very well have upped the ante by replying to
a limited missile strike with f urther chemical weapons attacks against his opponents, thereby compelling
Obama to choose between a humiliating climb-down or f urther escalation. Punitive action against
Damascus would also likely undermine ascendant moderate f actions in Tehran by conf irming the image of
American hostility, potentially derailing the administration’s ef f orts to resolve the standof f  over Iran’s
nuclear program –yet another Middle East imbroglio-  peacef ully.
The next f ew weeks will reveal much about Obama’s intentions. Should an eventual Security Council
resolution on the disarmament of  Syria’s chemical weapons not be accompanied by a f irm, unambiguous
statement f rom the White House promising swif t retaliation f or any delay or violation, it can be assumed
that he will continue searching f or ways of  staying out of  the f ighting. Bets are this president is willing to
acquiesce to a f udging on deadlines; once settled on a grand strategy, statesmen typically try to stay on
course in spite of  distractions.
A larger question is whether Obama’s grand strategy, which calls f or considerably more self -denial to which
Americans are tradit ionally accustomed when thinking about the world, can be sustained. Events in Syria will
be instrumental in determining its f ate. If  the conf lict can be contained largely within Syria’s borders,
Assad’s chemical weapons are ef f iciently brought under international control, an agreeable compromise on
Iran’s nuclear program is f ound and America’s economy steadily recovers, Obama will be able to make the
case to voters and the f oreign policy establishment alike that a policy of  restraint kept the peace and
f ostered prosperity, thereby creating momentum f or its perpetuation af ter he leaves of f ice.
Events, however, could take a dramatic turn f or the worse: sectarian violence and ref ugee outf lows might
yield a regionalized war, developments on the ground may threaten or embolden Tehran to advance
towards nuclear breakout capability or Islamist elements could consolidate control over large swaths of
Syria or gain access to chemical weapons. Any one of  these scenarios would be used as ammunition by
Obama’s many crit ics, already quick to denounce him as an apologist f or U.S. power, f or their contention
that his strategy of  retrenchment has endangered American security.
For a president so determined to avoid being bogged down in the Middle East, the irony that much of  his
f oreign policy legacy will be def ined there is striking.
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